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Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to shed some light on the nature, scope and impact of harmonisation 
of national criminal law by the European Union. It will, more specifically, attempt to 
understand  what  is  the  main  rationale  behind  the  adoption  of  European  criminal 
measures which harmonise national criminal offences and evaluate their impact on 
national legal orders. It will be argued that a main paradox emerges from this body of 
law,  namely  that  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  Treaty  of  the  European  Union 
envisaged harmonisation of national criminal law as being minimal, its scope and 
influence have been very broad, potentially bringing about a harsher criminal law 
across  the  EU.  This  broad  scope  was  facilitated  by  a  discourse  of  fight  against 
organised crime which became the main rationale for the adoption of harmonisation 
measures. The EU’s viewpoint on organised crime has been far-reaching. This is seen 
mainly in three elements: in the adoption of a very broad understanding of what a 
criminal organisation is; in the criminalisation of a wide range of offences under the 
“umbrella’  of  the  fight  against  organised  crime;  and,  finally,  in  the  potential 
application of the measures adopted under this rationale to common criminality and to 
the indirect achievement of other goals. Ultimately, this broad approach led to an 
increase  in  criminalisation  at  national  level,  namely  through  the  creation  of  new 
offences and through the expansion of the scope of existent ones.  
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Introduction 
 
European  criminal  law  is  one  of  the  most  dynamic  areas  of  integration  in  the 
European  Union.  Its  nature  is  in  the  process  of  being  shaped  and  its  impact  on 
national legal orders is still largely unknown. This paper adopts a legal perspective 
and  seeks  to  identify  what  the  main  rationale  behind  the  adoption  of  European 
criminal measures which harmonise national criminal offences is, and assess their 
influence on national legal orders.
3 A central paradox emerges from harmonisation in 
criminal matters, namely that although the harmonisation envisaged was minimal, its 
scope and influence have been very broad. The main rationale underlying the majority 
of measures adopted was the fight against organised crime, which the EU interpreted 
very broadly. It did so by adopting a broad definition of a criminal organisation, by 
criminalising a wide range of conducts under the “umbrella” of organised crime, and 
lastly  by  indirectly  opening  the  door  for  the  application  of  these  measures  to  the 
domain of common criminality and to the protection EC interests. Finally, this broad 
approach  was  also  reflected  on  national  legal  orders,  leading  to  an  increase  in 
criminalisation at domestic level, specifically through the creation of new offences 
and through the expansion of the scope of existent ones, potentially bringing about a 
harsher
4 criminal law across the EU. 
 
The paper will be divided into three main parts. Section 1 will explain the scope of 
harmonisation of national criminal law in terms of the offences that are concerned. It 
will show how the Treaty envisaged harmonisation as being limited to the minimum 
elements constituent of crimes at least in the areas of organised crime, terrorism and 
drug trafficking and how measures were adopted in a wider range of subject matters, 
far beyond those three domains. Section 2 of the paper will seek to identify the main 
                                                 
3 Harmonisation of national criminal law refers to the minimum elements constituent of crimes and 
penalties (Articles 29 and 31 Treaty of the European Union - TEU). This paper will only consider the 
harmonisation of offences and not that of penalties. 
4 Unless otherwise stated, when the words “harsh” or “lenient” are used in this paper the aim is not to 
pass any type of judgement on the particular law in question, but to acknowledge objectively that a 
certain measure is more harsh or lenient than usually found in the EU or than the measures previously 
existent at national level. 
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justification  for  the  adoption  of  these  measures.  It  will  show  how,  historically, 
organised crime became the main motto for action and how the EU legislator cast the 
idea of organised crime very broadly. It will further explore how many measures in 
areas which range from sexual exploitation of children, to money laundering or cyber 
crime, for example, were also adopted under the same rationale, emphasising the 
already broad interpretation of the concept given to it by the EU. This section will 
then explore how this wide approach to organised crime facilitates the application of 
this legislation to other types of criminality and how it also serves other interests. 
Finally, section 3 will shed some light on the influence that these measures are having 
on national legal orders. It will show how the wide range of measures adopted and the 
broad definitions of crime put forward by those measures led to more criminalisation 
at national level, namely by enlarging the scope of pre-existent criminal offences or 
by requiring Member States to create new ones. 
 
   4 
1 - The scope of harmonisation: minimum elements of crime v wide range of 
areas of intervention 
 
The basic architecture of criminal law in the third pillar is laid down in Title VI of the 
Treaty of the European Union, under the heading of police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. Article 29 TEU states that: “Without prejudice to the powers of the 
European Community, the Union's objective shall be to provide citizens with a high 
level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing common 
action among the Member States in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal  matters  and  by  preventing  and  combating  racism  and  xenophobia.  That 
objective  shall  be  achieved  by  preventing  and  combating  crime,  organised  or 
otherwise,  in  particular  terrorism,  trafficking  in  persons  and  offences  against 
children,  illicit  drug  trafficking  and  illicit  arms  trafficking,  corruption  and  fraud, 
through:  approximation,  where  necessary,  of  rules  on  criminal  matters  in  the 
Member States, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31(e).” 
 
Article 31 (3) provides: “Common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
shall include: progressively adopting measures establishing minimum rules relating 
to  the  constituent  elements  of  criminal  acts  and  to  penalties  in  the  fields  of 
organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking.” 
 
Harmonisation  of  national  criminal  law  does  not  occupy  a  central  role  in  these 
provisions,  but  rather  a  secondary  role  and  is  of  a  minimal  nature.  This  is  well 
perceived by the wording of Article 29 when it is stated that approximation should be 
pursued “where necessary”, therefore giving an idea that it is not always needed and 
that it should not be pursued when that is not the case. Furthermore, the Treaty also 
limits greatly the areas of harmonisation. Hence, harmonisation is envisaged clearly in 
only three areas of substantive criminal law, namely organised crime, terrorism and 
illicit  drug  trafficking;  whilst  it  limits  its  depth  to  the  minimum  rules  on  the 
constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties, as stated in Article 31 (e).    
   5 
The  secondary  nature  of  harmonisation  is  reasserted  by  the  Tampere  European 
Conclusions which endorse the principle of mutual recognition as the cornerstone of 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
5 
 
Furthermore, the minimal nature attributed to harmonisation of national criminal law 
is perceived also in the fact that most Joint Actions and Framework Decisions focus 
only on minimum elements constituent of crimes and penalties and on their succinct 
text.  Thus,  the  blueprint  followed  for  harmonisation  is  the  same  throughout  the 
majority of the Framework Decisions
6 and it focuses mainly on minimum elements 
constituent  of  crimes  and  penalties  as  mentioned  in  the  Treaty.
7  The  text  of 
Framework  Decisions  is  usually  concise  and  short,  except  in  what  concerns  the 
definition of the offence and in relation to penalties. The definition of offences is 
typically broad. Likewise, penalties receive added considerations and focus mainly 
on the establishment of minimum thresholds of maximum imprisonment sentences 
(there is no mention, for instance, of maximum sentences).  
 
The text of the Treaty clearly envisages harmonisation in criminal matters as being 
minimal.  There  is  no  attempt  to  attribute  a  comprehensive  and  overarching 
competence  of  the  European  Union  to  harmonise  national  criminal  laws.  Main 
principles of criminal law are not mentioned and the areas of intervention, even if not 
exhaustively mentioned, area clearly limited. The general outline of the Framework 
Decisions also gives an idea that it is a minimal intervention with limited objectives 
that focuses on very specific elements of the national criminal systems.  
 
This minimal nature has been acknowledged and criticised at times by some authors. 
Peers explains that “The EU’s third pillar powers are limited by the principle by 
subsidiarity, which constrains EU action as regards the substantive criminal law with 
a minimal cross-border impact. Furthermore, EU powers can only be used in this 
area to set minimum standards (or ‘minimum rules’, according to the wording of 
Article 31(1)(e)), leaving Member States to elaborate wider definitions of the offences 
described by the EU third pillar measures or to set penalties exceeding the minimum 
                                                 
5 Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15 and 16 October 1999, para 33. 
6 The emphasis here will be on Framework Decision not only because since Amsterdam they have, in 
practice, been the only instrument adopted but also because many of the Joint Actions have already 
either been replaced by Framework Decisions or there are proposals to replace them in the future.  
7 Articles 29 and 31 (e) TEU   6 
levels required by EU measures.”
8 Bosly and van Ravenstein contend that the two 
main limitations to harmonisation are the intergovernmental nature of Title VI which 
requires unanimity and, similarly to Peers, the principle of subsidiarity, mentioned by 
Article 2 TEU, and which requires that the EU should not intervene in matters that are 
better decided and handled at national level.
9 
 
Weyembergh voices some concerns with the limitations of the scope of harmonisation 
noting that “as regards the content of the adopted texts, most of the approximation 
efforts  have  concerned  the  substantive  part  of  criminal  law:  generally  speaking, 
criminal procedure has been neglected. Even as regards substantive criminal law, 
only some of its aspects have been approximated. The level of sanctions have been 
tackled  but,  despite  certain  developments,  rather  vaguely.  Most  efforts  have 
concerned the definition of certain types of offences. However, numerous articles of 
framework  decisions  concerned  are  restricted  in  the  sense  that  they  grant  to  the 
Member States a possibility to derogate from the obligation contained therein. In that 
respect, one can speak of harmonisation ‘en trompe l’oeil’.”
10 
 
To be sure, the Treaty’s provisions very clearly lay down the fact that there is no 
comprehensive competence of the European Union to harmonise national criminal 
law, as the Treaty seems to confer competence only to adopt measures in the areas 
mentioned by Article 31 (e) - organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking. 
This limited approach in the depth of harmonisation contrasts greatly with the range 
of subject matters in relation to which measures have been adopted. Undeniably, Title 
VI is confusing at times and it is unclear at this stage if the competence to act in other 
domains besides those mentioned in Article 31 (e) exists. Whilst some authors argue 
that the competence provided by the provision is exhaustive,
11 others contend that the 
wording of Article 31 leaves room for some ambiguity.
12 The latter is created mainly 
                                                 
8 Peers, S. (2007) “EU Justice and Home Affairs Law”, Oxford EC Law Library, p. 287-288. 
9 Bosly and van Ravenstein, “L’Harmonisation des incriminations”, p. 24, in Flore D. et al. (2003) 
“Actualites du droit penal europeen”, Les dossiers de la Revue de Droit Penal et de Criminologie, 9, 
Bruxelles, La Charte. 
10 Weyembergh, A. (2005) “The Functions of Approximation of Penal legislation Within the European 
Union”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 12(2): p. 15 
11 Vermeulen G. (2002) “Where do we currently stand with harmonisation in Europe?”, in Klip and 
Vander  Wilt  (Eds),  in  Harmonisation  and  Harmonising  measures  in  criminal  law”,  Royal 
Netherlands Academy of Sciences, p. 65. 
12 Mitsilegas V. (2009) “EU Criminal Law”, Modern Studies in European Law, Hart Publishing, p. 85 
and Weyembergh A. (2005) “Approximation of criminal laws, the Constitutional Treaty and the Hague 
Programme”, Common Market Law Review, 42, p. 1569.   7 
by the wording of Article 29, mentioned earlier, and which sets the broads goals and 
guidelines  of  intervention  in  criminal  matters.  The  article  seems  not  to  delimit 
exhaustively the scope of intervention of the European Union by stating that a “high 
level of safety… shall be achieved by preventing crime, organised and otherwise, in 
particular terrorism, trafficking in persons ad offences against children, illicit drug 
trafficking  and  illicit  arms  trafficking,  corruption  and  fraud.”  The  use  of  the 
expression “in particular” seems to suggest precisely the non-exhaustive nature of the 
wording as noted by Mitsilegas.
13 Peers
14 (2006) and Bosly and van Ravenstein
15 
seem to have no doubts that harmonisation can be extended to other areas besides 
those mentioned in Article 31 (e).   
 
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the scope of letra legis of the Treaty, a broad 
interpretation seems to be prevailing at this point. The EU’s intervention in criminal 
matters  is  being  driven  by  an  expanding  in  criminal  matters  and  in  particular  in 
harmonising  measures.  Indeed,  the  European  Union  adopted  a  wide  range  of 
Framework  Decisions  aiming  at  harmonising  the  minimum  elements  of  criminal 
offences and penalties at national level. The range of areas involved goes far beyond 
the list of competences referred to by Article 29, let alone Article 31. To be sure, 
Framework Decisions were adopted in areas as diverse as illicit drug trafficking
16, 
sexual  exploitation  of  children  and  child  pornography
17,  terrorism
18,  standing  of 
victims  in  criminal  proceedings
19,  fraud  and  counterfeiting  of  non-cash  means  of 
payment
20,  money  laundering
21,  trafficking  in  human  beings,
22  corruption  in  the 
                                                 
13 Idem.  
14 See n 10 above. 
15 Bosly and van Ravenstein, p. 21, n 11 above.  
16 Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 October 2004 laying down minimum provisions 
on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking, OJ L 
335/8 [2004]. 
17  Council  Framework  Decision  2004/68/JHA  of  22  December  2003  on  combating  the  sexual 
exploitation of children and child pornography, OJ L 13/44 [2004]. 
18 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, OJ L 164/3 
[2002] and Proposal for a Framework Decision amending the Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on 
combating terrorism, COM (2007) 0650, Brussels, 6.11.2007. 
19  Council  Framework  Decision  2001/220/JHA  of  15  March  2001  on  the  standing  of  victims  in 
criminal proceedings, OJ L 82/1 [2001]. 
20 Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA of 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of 
non-cash means of payment, OJ L 149/1 [2001]. 
21  Council  Framework  Decision  2001/500/  JHA  of  26  June  2001  on  money  laundering,  the 
identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime, 
OJ L 182/1 [2001]. 
22 Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human 
beings, OJ L 203/1 [2002].   8 
private sector
23, crime against information system
24, environment
25 and ship-source 
pollution,
26 among others. 
 
These trends of expanding competence are not necessarily surprising as they have 
been  legitimated  by  several  Action  Plans  and  Programmes,  which  came  to 
complement and assist the completion of the Area of freedom, security and justice or 
in the fight against organised crime.
27 The Vienna Action Plan, for example, set a 
road map for guidance on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice adopted in 1998 covered 
action  in  judicial  cooperation  in  criminal  matters  and  specifically  how  to  tackle 
organised  crime  by  facilitating  procedures  and  approximating  legislation  where 
necessary.
28 It mentioned far more areas of crime than the ones mentioned in the 
Treaty:  “…this  goes  in  particular  for  policy  areas  where  the  Union  has  already 
developed  common  policies,  and  for  policy  areas  with  strong  cross-border 
implications such as environmental crime, high-tech crime, corruption and fraud, 
money laundering, etc.”
29 
 
This  major  intervention  was  also  promoted  by  the  Tampere  Conclusions
30  -  the 
landmark document for the development of the Area of freedom, security and justice 
until 2005, which confirmed the need for intervention in the same areas mentioned by 
the Vienna Action Plan: “Without prejudice to the broader areas envisaged in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam and in the Vienna Action Plan, the European Council considers 
that, with regard to national criminal law, efforts to agree on common definitions, 
incriminations  and  sanctions  should  be  focused  in  the  first  instance  on  a  limited 
number  of  sectors  of  particular  relevance,  such  as  financial  crime  (money 
laundering,  corruption,  Euro  counterfeiting),  drugs  trafficking,  trafficking  in 
                                                 
23 Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private 
sector, OJ L 192/54 [2003]. 
24 Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information 
systems, OJ L 69/67 [2005]. 
25  Council  Framework  Decision  2003/80/JHA  of  27  January  2003  on  the  protection  of  the 
environment through criminal law, OJ L 29/55 [2003] 
26  Council  Framework  Decision  2005/667/JHA  of  12  July  2005  to  strengthen  the  criminal-law 
framework for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution, OJ L255/164 [2005] 
27  Vienna  Action  Plan,  Tampere  Conclusions  and  Hague  Programme,  Doc  16054/04,  JAI  559, 
Brussels, 13 December 2004. 
28 Para 17 of the Action Plan. 
29 Para 18, Idem. 
30 Tampere Conclusions, the European Council of Tampere specifically met to discuss justice and 
home affairs issues. Two broad themes emerged from the meeting: common EU asylum and migration 
policy and a Union wide fight against crime, n. 6 above.   9 
human beings, particularly exploitation of women, sexual exploitation of children, 
high tech crime and environmental crime.”
31 
 
Finally,  the  Hague  Programme,  which  replaced  the  Tampere  Conclusions  and 
provides the road map for police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, calls for 
intervention in more general terms, namely in areas with a cross-border dimension 
and in those domains referred to by the Treaty: “The European Council recalls that 
the  establishment  of  minimum  rules  concerning  aspects  of  procedural  law  is 
envisaged by the treaties in order to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and 
judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a 
cross-border dimension. The approximation of substantive criminal law serves the 
same purposes and concerns areas of particular serious crime with cross-border 
dimensions.  Priority  should  be  given  to  areas  of  crime  that  are  specifically 
mentioned in the Treaties.”
32 
 
2 - Organised crime as the main rationale for intervention 
 
Historical overview of the fight against organised crime through harmonisation 
 
The  expansion  of  the  areas  of  intervention,  together  with  the  minimal  nature  of 
measures, begs the question of what rationale(s) and goal(s) (if any) are behind the 
intervention of the EU in so many varied areas. Weyembergh argues that there is a 
lack of coherence in approximation as measures have been adopted in domains so 
diverse as drug trafficking, sexual exploitation of children, private corruption and 
money laundering.
33 Peers further notes the lack of a clear policy goal or programme 
namely  because  there  has  never  been  a  formally  agreed  harmonization  agenda  of 
substantive criminal law but only ad hoc proposals by different Member States and 
the Commission. Even in the Tampere European Council, the Council never set out a 
precise agenda in this field, referring itself only to a non-exhaustive list of crimes with 
                                                 
31 Para 48, Tampere Conclusions, n. 6 above.  
32 Page 29, point 3.3.2., Hague Programme, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/information_dossiers/the_hague_priorities/doc/08_organised_cr
ime_en.pdf 
33 Weyembergh, p. 1585, n. 12.   10 
no specific timetable for implementation.
34 Flore also remarks that European criminal 
law still lacks a coherent project.
35 
 
It is argued here that it is possible to identify a main driving force of intervention in 
criminal matters and in particular in the large majority of harmonisation measures 
adopted - the fight against organised crime. The latter has been, in fact, the main 
rationale driving the expansionist dynamic of the EU’s harmonisation in criminal 
matters, which can be indentified both in the grounds for adoption of measures as well 
as in the goals these pursue. First, the fight against organised crime “has been one of 
the main motors for the advancement of European integration in the field of criminal 
law”.
36 Indeed, historically organised crime has been a main motto for harmonisation 
measures ever since the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht and was also of central 
importance in relation to cooperation in criminal matters even prior to this signing of 
the Maastricht Treaty. During the Maastricht years organised crime emerged as the 
main narrative for intervention in criminal matters and became the leading motto for 
the adoption of the bulk of legislation in criminal matters. This primary role is seen, 
for  instance,  in  the  Action  Plan  to  combat  organised  crime  adopted  in  1997  and  
which stated that “Organised crime is increasingly becoming a threat to society as we 
know  it  and  want  to  preserve  it.  Criminal  behavior  no  longer  is  the  domain  of 
individuals only, but also of organizations that pervade the various structures of civil 
society, and indeed society as a whole. Crime is increasingly organizing itself across 
national  borders,  also  taking  advantage  of  the  free  movement  of  goods,  capital, 
services and persons.”
37 Furthermore, the importance of the action against organised 
criminality was reasserted in several Joint Actions and Conventions. The Joint Action 
on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation
38 states in the 
Preamble that “the Council considers that the seriousness and development of certain 
forms of organised crime require strengthening of cooperation between the Member 
States of the European Union, particularly as regards the following offences: drug 
trafficking, trafficking in human beings, terrorism, trafficking in works of art, money 
laundering, serious economic crime, extortion and other acts of violence against the 
                                                 
34 Peers, p. 402, n. 10.  
35 Flore D. (2003) “Un Droit Penale Europeen: Hasard ou Necessite”, in Actualites du Droit Penal 
Europeen, Les Dossiers de la Revue du Droip Penale et de Criminologie (9), La Chartre, Bruxelles, 
p. 16. 
36 Mitsilegas, p. 93, n.14. 
37 Para 1 of the “Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime”, adopted by the Council on 27 April 1997, 
OJ C251/1 [1997] 
38 Joint Action 98/733/JHA of 21 December 1998, OJ L 351/1 [1998]   11 
life,  physical  integrity  or  liberty  of  a  person,  or  creating  a  collective  danger  for 
persons.”  Joint  Actions  on  subject  matters  ranging  from  money  laundering  and 
proceeds of crime to trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of children, 
among  others,  were  thus  adopted,  all  with  the  same  broad  purpose  of  fighting 
organised  crime.  The  list  of  conducts  mentioned  in  the  former  Joint  Action  was 
considerable. This view that organised crime was to be understood as including a 
wide  range  of  criminality  was  confirmed  in  other  measures  and  domains  besides 
harmonisation  of  national  criminal  law.  It  was  visible,  for  example,  in  the  Joint 
Action establishing a programme of exchanges, training and cooperation for persons 
responsible for action to combat organised crime, the so-called “Falcone Programme” 
in which it was stated to be necessary “to adopt a broad approach to phenomena of 
organised  crime,  including  economic  crime,  fraud,  corruption  and  money-
laundering.”
39   
 
The importance of the fight against organised crime was further confirmed by the 
Amsterdam  Treaty.  The  importance  of  action  along  these  lines  is  reasserted,  for 
instance, by the Tampere European Council Conclusions, in which the Presidency 
called  for  “efforts  to  agree  on  common  definitions,  incriminations  and  sanctions 
[which] should be focused in the first instance on a limited number of sectors of 
particular relevance, such as financial crime (money laundering, corruption, Euro 
counterfeiting),  drugs  trafficking,  trafficking  in  human  beings,  particularly 
exploitation  of  women,  sexual  exploitation  of  children,  high  tech  crime  and 
environmental  crime.”
40  The  Hague  Programme  further  elaborated  on  this  and 
organised crime was given a separate section whilst the Commission made clear that 
“Fighting against organised crime is a priority of the Commission’s action”, namely 
through the development of common methodologies, crime statistics systems, crime 
proofing legislation, an EU anti-corruption policy, the strengthening of Europol and 
Eurojust, the strengthening of the investigation resources and tools to address the 
financial aspects of organized crime and the prevention of human trafficking.
41 
 
After  Amsterdam,  measures  were  adopted  in  almost  all  areas  referred  to  by  the 
previously  mentioned  documents.  Many  of  them  replaced  Joint  Actions  and 
                                                 
39 Joint Action 98/245/JHA of 19 March 1998, OJ L 99/8 [1998]. 
40 Para 48 of the Presidency Conclusion of the Tampere European Council, Tampere, 15 and 16 
October 1999. 
41 Section 8 of the Hague Programme, n. 35 above.   12 
Conventions already in force whilst some others were adopted anew. Similarly to 
what was seen during the Maastricht period, organised crime is the main narrative for 
intervention in the majority of the measures adopted which is clearly seen in the 
Preamble  of  most  of  these  new  Framework  Decisions.  As  mentioned  earlier, 
measures  were  adopted  in  areas  which  range  from  illicit  drug  trafficking,
42  to 
trafficking in human beings,
43 or crimes against information system.
44 The latter, for 
example, states in its preamble that “There is evidence of attacks against information 
systems, in particular as a result of the threat from organised crime, and increasing 
concern at the potential of terrorist attacks against information systems which form 
part of the critical infrastructure of the Member States.”
45 The Framework Decision 
on sexual exploitation of children and child pornography also requires that “Penalties 
must be introduced against the perpetrators of such offences which are sufficiently 
stringent to bring sexual exploitation of children and child pornography within the 
scope  of  instruments  already  adopted  for  the  purpose  of  combating  organised 
crime…”
46  whereas  the  Framework  Decision  on  money  laundering  recalled  that 
“money  laundering  is  at  the  heart  of  organised  crime  and  should  be  rooted  out 
wherever it occurs.”
47  
 
A broad approach to the concept of organised crime by the EU legislator 
 
Organised crime per se 
 
The central measure in force in relation to organised crime is the Joint Action making 
it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation in the Member States of 
the European Union.
48 The Joint Action refers to two types of conduct that shall be 
                                                 
42 See n. 18 above.  
43 See n. 24 above. 
44 See n. 26 above. 
45  §2 of the preamble of the Framework Decision, n. 26. 
46  §9 of the preamble of the Framework Decision, n. 19. 
47  §6 of the preamble of the Framework Decision, n. 23. 
48 See n. 41 above. A Framework Decision on the fight against organised crime whose definition 
correspond largely to the ones of the Joint Action was already adopted but is not yet in force. OJ L 
300/42  [2008].  For  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  Joint  Action  see  Mitsilegas  V.  (2001),  “Defining 
organised crime in the European Union: the limits of European criminal law in an area of ‘freedom, 
security and justice’”, European Law Review, 26; and for an analysis of the Framework Decision see 
Calderoni F. (2008), “A Definition that Could not Work: the EU Framework Decision on the Fight 
against Organised Crime”, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 16.   13 
punishable by Member States (one or both conducts can be criminalised). The first is 
the agreement to take part in such activities, even if an offence is not carried out (the 
so-called  “participation  in  a  criminal  organisation”  or  “membership  of  a  criminal 
organisation”); whilst the second is to actively take part in the actual execution of the 
offences related to criminal organisations (even if no offence is actually committed) 
or to organise activities that might contribute to the achievement of the organisation’s 
criminal activities (i.e. the actual commitment of an offence of or the “conspiracy” to 
commit an offence).
49 
 
The  criminalisation  of  participation  in  a  criminal  organisation,  the  first  offence 
described by the Joint Action, is one of the two key legal approaches to organised 
crime and is considered the more extreme one, usually adopted by countries which 
have particular problems with organised crime, such as Italy or the USA.
50 Not only 
did  the  EU  choose  to  follow  such  an  approach  (although  it  also  followed  other 
approaches as will be seen below), but it did so in a very broad manner by adopting a 
wide legal definition of what is to be considered a criminal organisation. 
 
The  Joint  Action  defines  a  criminal  organisation  as  a  “structured  association, 
established over a period of time, of more than two persons, acting in concert with a 
view  to  committing  offences  which  are  punishable  by  deprivation  of  liberty  or  a 
detention  order  of  a  maximum  of  at  least  four  years  or  a  more  serious  penalty, 
whether  the  offences  are  an  end  in  themselves  or  a  means  of  obtaining  material 
benefits and, where appropriate, of improperly influencing the operation of public 
authorities.”
51 The first striking element of this definition is the requirement of only 
three members for an association to be considered a criminal organisation. Indeed, the 
                                                 
49 Article 2, of the Joint Action on organised crime, n 41. The text of the Article specifically holds 
that:  “To  assist  the  fight  against  criminal  organisations,  each  Member  States  shall  undertake,  in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 6, to ensure that one or both types of conduct 
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within Article 1, even if that person does not take part in the actual execution of the activity.”  
50 Leong A. (2007) “The disruption of International Organised Crime: an analysis of legal and non 
legal strategies”, International and Comparative Criminal Justice, Ashgate, p. 91.  
51 Article 1, Idem..   14 
idea that one has of a criminal organisation is usually not one association with only 
three members. On the other hand, this broad understanding is not compensated by 
other requirements of structure or of any link to (illegal) business minded activities, 
through  the  introduction  of,  for  example,  an  element  of  entrepreneurship  in  the 
definition, which is common to national legal orders.
52 Furthermore, the definition 
offered includes cases where the offence committed is an “end in itself” or a means of 
obtaining material benefits. The commission of offences as an end in itself is also 
extremely broad and it was even dropped from the text of the Framework Decision 
which will replace the Joint Action.
53 In this new version, a criminal organisation will 
be considered “a structured association… of more than two persons acting in concert 
with the view to committing offences… to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or 
other material benefit.”
54 Yet, the notion of “financial or material benefits” is broad 
and vague. Is a material benefit of £100 or £200 enough to be included in the range of 
the concept of organised crime? And what can be considered a material benefit? 
 
Traditionally, definitions of criminal organisations tend to be narrower. For example, 
even  if  only  a  small  number  of  members  is  required,  such  an  element  is  usually 
compensated for by other more clear and objective elements as can be seen in the 
definition  used  in  1998  by  the  BundesKriminalAmt  (Germany's  Federal  Criminal 
Police Office): “Organised crime if the planned violation of the law for profit or to 
acquire power, which offences are each, or together, of a major significance, and are 
carried out by more than two participants who co-operate within a division of labour 
for  a  long  or  undetermined  time  span  using  (a)  commercial  or  commercial  like 
structures, or (b) violence or other means of intimidation, or (c) influence on politics, 
media, public administration, justice and the legitimate economy.”
 55 
 
While internationally there is a clear trend to broaden definitions of organised crime, 
as  seen  for  instance  in  the  United  Nations  Convention  against  Transnational 
Organised Crime, still the concept is more limited than the EU’s in that it refers to the 
crimes mentioned in the Convention which provides more legal certainty than the 
mere “offences which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of 
                                                 
52 Symeodidou-Kastanidou E. (2007) “Towards a New Definition of Organised Crime in the European 
Union”, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice,  p.98-100 and Leong, p. 
15 (see footnote x).  
53 See Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision, n. 59. 
54 Idem.  
55  In Leong, p. 17, n. 62.   15 
a maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty.”
56 The UN Convention 
defines organised crime as: “a structured group of three or more person existing for a 
period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one of the more 
serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to 
obtain,  directly  or  indirectly,  a  financial  or  other  material  benefit.”
57  The  EU’s 
definition contrasts largely with the traditional understanding of what organised crime 
even if its evolution is taken into account. Indeed, in general, concerns with organised 
crime have evolved from specific concerns with organisations such as the Mafia and 
“La Cosa Nostra” and other Mafia-like organisations to looser forms of hierarchical, 
structured,  and  more  business  minded  or  even  terrorist  linked  organizations.
58 
Nonetheless, as has been shown, the EU’s approach is much broader and does not 
require some of the typical links of other definitions.  
 
Literature  on  organised  crime  also  tends  to  require  more  elements  than  those 
mentioned by the Joint Action and Framework Decision in order to categorise an 
offence  as  one  of  organised  criminality  or  a  group  as  a  criminal  organisation. 
Abadinsky, for example, mentions eight attributes of organised crime, namely the 
non-ideological  nature  of  the  group,  the  existence  of  an  hierarchy,  a  limited  or 
exclusive membership which perpetuated it self, the willingness to use violence and 
bribery, a specialisation of division of labour, monopolistic and being governed by 
rules  and  regulations.
59  Maltz  on  the  other  hand  identifies  only  four  main 
characteristics, namely varieties of the crimes committed, an organised structure, the 
use  of  violence  and  corruption.
60  The  definition  adopted  by  the  EU  measures  is 
certainly looser than these, thus stricter from a legal point of view. Levi suggests that 
such a broad definition of organised crime results from a tension between “a) those 
who want the legislator to cover a wide set of circumstances to avoid the risk that any 
major criminal might ‘get away with’, and b) those who want the law to be quite 
tightly drawn to avoid the overreach of powers which might otherwise criminalise 
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59 Abadinsky H. (1985) “Organised Crime”, Nelson Hall Chicago, 2nd Edition, p. 5-7. 
60 Maltz M.D. (1976) “On defining organised crime: the development of a definition and a typology”, 
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crime”, Trends in Organized Crime, 8, n 3.   16 
groups who are only of a modest threat.” Such tension is usually solved in favour of 
the loose definitions with concerns over security
61 which seems to have been the case 
in the EU context.  
 
To be sure there is no agreement on a common definition of what organised crime 
across the EU, not least because both the Joint Action and the Framework Decision 
give Member States the option to criminalise only one or both the participation in the 
criminal organisation or the conspiracy to commit actions, besides the commission of 
the offences itself. In this sense, Mitsilegas stresses that “…the concept of organised 
crime is far from harmonised at EU level. This is striking in the light of the fact that 
organised crime has the substantial transnational dimension and forms the basis of 
co-operation between national judicial and police authorities across the EU… and 
justifies to a great extent the existence… of Union criminal justice bodies such as 
Europol and Eurojust.” The author argues that it is necessary to look at the “ultimate 
aim of harmonisation of substantive criminal law in this context.” and then notes “The 
Commission  talks  about  harmonisation  across  the  EU  but  the  Council  documents 
refer  to  ‘prosecutorial  benefits’  at  national  level.  If  one  looks  at  the  Framework 
Decision strictly as necessary to ensure the prosecutorial efficiency at the national 
level, then the lack of clarity and the absence of a high level of harmonisation is 
perhaps not as crucial.”
62    
 
The  lack  of  a  clear  and  common  definition  certainly  is  not  desirable  from  the 
perspective  of  legal  certainty.  Nonetheless,  it  offers  other  benefits  from  a  law 
enforcement point of view: the loose concept of “criminal association” leaves the 
door open to the interpretation of whether or not a specific offence is to be considered 
one of organised crime, and loose and broad definitions potentially incorporate more 
behaviours in its context than stricter ones. i.e. the definition of organised crime given 
by the Joint Action and Framework Decision has the potential to include a wide range 
of  criminality  even  if  only  loosely  related  to  the  traditional  understandings  of 
organised crime. This overarching nature of organised crime has been explored by the 
EU and is better explored in the two following sections.    
                                                 
61  Levi  M.  (2006)  “Organised  crime  and  terrorism”,  in  The  Oxford  Handbook  of  Criminology, 
Maguire M., Morgan, R. and Reiner R. (Ed.), Oxford Press, p. 780. 
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Criminality related to organised crime 
 
Besides the criminalisation of the membership of a criminal organisation, a second 
legal technique to fight organised crime consists of the criminalisation of specific 
offences committed by members of an organised criminal group. Such an approach 
focuses on legal measures in several areas related to organised crime. Van Duyne 
identifies  three  main  areas  of  legal  intervention  in  cross-border  organised  crime, 
namely, human misery and trafficking, economic crime and corruption and money 
laundering, and prohibited goods,
63 whilst terrorism is increasingly being brought into 
such a context.
64 The EU adopted legislation in all four areas and went further by 
criminalising  offences  against  information  systems  and  directly  linking  them  to 
organised  crime  as  it  will  become  apparent  bellow.  Furthermore,  similarly  to  the 
approach with regard to the legal definition of organised crime, the definitions agreed 
to are very broad which leads to a high minimum standard of harmonisation across 
the EU. Ultimately, this is leading to more criminalisation at national level, as it will 
be demonstrated in the final section of this paper. This section will explore the wide 
range of measures adopted in order to fight organised crime.  
 
Human misery 
Human misery and trafficking is one of the cross-border crimes market as mentioned 
by van Duyne
65 in which the EU also intervenes. Trafficking of human beings usually 
relates to very organised and established networks of criminals. A first attempt to 
criminalise  trafficking  on  human  beings  was  made  with  the  Joint  Action  on 
combating  trafficking  of  human  beings  and  sexual  exploitation  of  children.
66 T he 
Framework Decision on the trafficking of human beings followed the Joint Action.
67 
The latter states in the Preamble its underlying rationale for the protection of human 
dignity  and  other  human  rights,  as  it  endorses  such  protection  through  the 
criminalisation of the action of trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation and 
forced labour.
68 Furthermore, it holds that its aim is to complement existing measures 
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University Press, 217 
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66 OJ L 63/2, [1997] 
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such as the UN Convention against transnational organised crimes
69 and the Joint 
Action on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation.
70 The 
Framework  Decision  defines  the  offence  of  trafficking  of  human  beings  for  the 
purposes  of  labour  exploitation  or  sexual  exploitation  as  the  recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring, subsequent reception of a person, including the 
exchange or transfer of control over that person. It specifies that such acts shall be 
punishable where use is made of coercion, force or threat, including abduction or 
where use is made of deceit or fraud or there is an abuse of authority or of a position 
of  vulnerability  or  where  payments  or  benefits  are  given  or  received  to  achieve 
consent of the person.
71 Also in the context of “human misery and trafficking” comes 
the adoption in 2004 of the Framework Decision on combating the sexual exploitation 
of children and child pornography.
72 The Framework decision particularly requires 
the  criminalisation  of  the  coercion,  recruitment  and  engaging  of  a  child  into 
prostitution or pornographic performances;
73 equally, it requires the criminalisation of 
the  production,  distribution,  dissemination  or  transmission,  supply,  acquisition  or 
possession of child pornography.
74  
 
Economic crime 
The fight against organised crime has also focused greatly on the protection of the 
stability of the financial system of the EU. The Council adopted a Joint action in 
1998,
75  which  was  partially  replaced  by  the  Framework  Decision  on  money 
laundering,  on  the  identification,  tracing,  freezing  and  confiscation  of  the 
instrumentalities and the proceeds from crime.
76 The Framework Decision’s preamble 
declares that “money laundering is at the very heart of organised crime and should be 
rooted out wherever it occurs.”
77 The Joint Action and the Framework Decision call 
upon  Member  States  to  ensure  that  no  reservations  are  made  to  Article  6  of  the 
Council  of  Europe  money  laundering  Convention
78  which  inter  alia  categorises 
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money laundering as serious crimes in general.
79 The Convention in its version of 
1990 defined “laundering offences” as the conversion or transfer of property for the 
purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of property or assisting in doing 
so; the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, etc, knowing that 
such property was proceeds; the same as to the acquisition, possession or the use of 
property; and the participation, attempt, conspiracy, aiding, abetting, or facilitating 
and counselling the commission of an offence.”
80  
 
The emphasis in relation to financial crime is also seen in more measures, namely the 
Framework Decision on combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of 
payment.
81 The Framework Decision calls for the criminalisation, at least in respect of 
credit cards, Euro cheque cards, other cards issued by financial institutions, travellers 
cheques, Euro cheques, other cheques and bills of exchange, of “the theft or other 
unlawful  appropriation  of  a  payment  instruments”;  of  “the  counterfeiting  or 
falsification of a payments instrument in order for it to be used fraudulently”; of “the 
receiving, obtaining, transporting, sale or transfer to another person or possession of 
a  stolen  or  otherwise  unlawfully  appropriated,  or  of  a  counterfeiting  or  falsified 
payment instrument in order for it to be used fraudulently”, and of “the fraudulent use 
of a stolen or otherwise unlawfully appropriated or of a counterfeited or falsified 
payment.”
82  Performing  these  same  acts  intentionally,  without  right  “introducing, 
altering, deleting or suppressing computer data”, by interfering with the functioning 
of a computer programme or system,
83 or the fraudulent making, receiving, obtaining, 
sale or transfer to another person or possession of “instruments, articles, computer 
programmes  and  any  other  means  peculiarly  adapted  for  the  commission  of  the 
previous referred offences”
84 shall also be considered a criminal offence. 
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The Framework Decision on confiscation of crime related proceeds, instrumentalities 
and property
85 also plays an important role in the weakening of the foundations of 
organised crime. It requires Member States to take the necessary measures to enable 
the confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds from criminal offences punishable 
for deprivation of liberty for more than one year, or property the value of which 
corresponds  to  such  proceeds.
86  It  also  provides  for  the  confiscation  of  proceeds 
originated from crimes mentioned in the Framework Decisions on the counterfeiting 
of  the  Euro,  money  laundering,  trafficking  of  human  beings,  facilitation  of 
unauthorised entry, transit and residence, sexual exploitation of children and child 
pornography,  drug  trafficking  and  terrorism  provided  that  the  offences  other  than 
money laundering are punishable with a custodial sentence of a maximum of at least 
between  5  and  10  years  of  imprisonment  and,  regarding  money  laundering  of  a 
maximum of at least 4 years of imprisonment
87, among other typical dispositions
88.  
 
Prohibited goods 
The  Framework  Decision  on  drug  trafficking  does  not  refer  to  organised  crime 
directly in its preamble. This silence is understandable given that Article 31 TEU 
particularly  refers  to  drug  trafficking  as  one  of  the  areas  where  the  EU  has 
competence to adopt harmonising measures where necessary. This implies that the 
link  to  organised  crime  as  a  means  to  justify  the  adoption  of  a  measure  is  not 
necessary in this case. Regardless, much of the concern with organised crime around 
the world has been due to its association with illegal drugs
89 and so it was earlier in 
the EU. This was particularly visible in the pre-Maastricht and Maastricht era. For 
example, in the first European Council Conclusions to address the issue of combat 
against organised crime –the European Council in Rome in 1990 – the Member States 
emphasised the “considerable importance attaching to the systematic and sustained 
strengthening of the action taken by the Community and its Member States to combat 
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89 Levi, p. 788, n. 16.   21 
drugs and organised crime.”
90 This link was reasserted in other Conclusions as, for 
instance the European Council Presidency Conclusions in Cardiff on 15 and 16 of 
June 1998 where it was noted that further measures were to be promoted “stepping up 
the fight against drugs and organised crime.”
91 Furthermore, it is clear from the text 
of the Framework Decision that it also applies to organised crime, namely because 
specific penalties are required for such cases. The Framework Decision cannot thus be 
separated from the rationale used for the adoption of other measures as drug traffic 
and organised as so deeply intertwined.  
 
The  Framework  Decision  calls  for  the  criminalisation  of  the  “production, 
manufacture, extraction, preparation, offering, offering for sale, distribution, sale, 
delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, 
importation or exportation of drugs”; of the “the cultivation of opium poppy, coca 
bush or cannabis plant”; of the “possession or purchase of drugs with a view to 
conducting one of the activities listed in (a)”; and of the “manufacture, transport and 
distribution  of  precursors,  knowing  that  they  are  to  be  used  in  or  for  the  illicit 
production or manufacture of drugs.”
92 
Terrorism 
Terrorism  is  specifically  mentioned  by  the  Treaty  as  one  of  the  three  areas  of 
harmonisation but, like drug trafficking, it falls under the broad context of the fight 
against  organised  crime  in  the  EU.  First,  the  Framework  Decision  on  combating 
terrorism, the Joint Action on organised crime and the Proposal for a Framework 
Decision on organised crime all make the link between the two.
93  Second, the types 
of  values  protected  by  the  Framework  Decision  (namely  the  political  system  and 
democratic ideology of the EU) are common to many values and interests protected 
by measures on organised crime as will be seen further below. Finally, doctrine tends 
to associate the two more and more nowadays. Indeed, terrorism and organised crime 
have traditionally had very different motivations, while terrorist groups tend to be 
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ideologically,  politically  or  religiously  motivated  aiming  at  the  creation  of 
psychological repercussions and widespread fear, organised crime groups tend to be 
self-interested  and  economically  driven.  Nonetheless,  in  recent  years  there  is  a 
growing  awareness  that  both  might  be  linked
94  and  although  they  have  distinct 
objectives, they have common enemies: the authority and the state.
95  
The definition adopted and proposed by the EU, is one of the widest ever adopted or 
proposed by national legislators or academics. The Framework Decision offers one of 
the broadest definitions of all the examples given. It states that acts committed with an 
“aim of seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government or 
international  organisation  to  perform  or  abstain  from  performing  any  act,  or 
seriously  destabilising  or  destroying  the  fundamental  political,  constitutional, 
economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation, shall be 
deemed to be terrorist offences.”
96 
Cyber crime 
Finally, an area of relative innovation by the EU is the internet and the need to adopt 
legislation  in  cyber  crime  control.  The  Council  Framework  Decision  on  attacks 
against information systems
97 deals with potential “…threats from organised crime 
and  increasing  concern  at  the  potential  of  terrorist  attacks  against  information 
systems  which  form  part  of  the  critical  infrastructure  of  the  Member  States.  This 
constitutes a threat to the achievement of a safer information society and of an area of 
freedom, security and justice.”
98  
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Accordingly,  an  effective  response  to  those  threats  requires  a  comprehensive 
approach to network and information society, as provided for in the eEurope Action 
Plan: an information society for all
99 and in the Council Resolution on a European 
approach towards a culture of network and information security.
100 The Framework 
Decision provides for the criminalisation of access without a right to the whole or any 
part of an information system;
101 of the intentional serious hindering or interruption of 
the  functioning  of  an  information  system  by  inputting,  transmitting,  damaging, 
deleting, deteriorating, altering, suppressing or rendering inaccessible computer data, 
when  committed  without  right;
102  the  same  is  applicable  to  data  in  a  computer 
system.
103 The Framework Decision contains further details on penalties and liability 
of legal persons.
104 
 
Organised crime as an umbrella for the pursuit of other goals 
 
The EU’s broad understanding of organised crime allows for such a rationale to serve 
as an “umbrella” for the achievement of other goals beyond the fight of organised 
criminality, namely to address common criminality and the protection of EC policies. 
Problematically,  this  expands  the  EU’s  competence  to  the  realm  of  common 
criminality and indirectly to first pillar which in theory still lies within the Member 
States’  realm  of  competence.  Indeed,  measures  adopted  under  the  rationale  of 
organised  crime  are  potentially  applicable  to  common  criminality,  i.e.  while  the 
Preambles justify the adoption of the legislation in order to fight organised crime, no 
where in the text of the Framework Decisions or Joint Actions the applicability only 
in such cases is required. Thus, they are potentially applicable to, for instance, money 
laundering,  fraud,  counterfeiting  of  non-cash  means  of  payment,  cyber  crime  and 
other offences mentioned above even if these are not undertaken in the context of a 
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criminal organisation. This is also clear from the fact that most of these Framework 
Decisions have particular provisions requiring harsher punishment when the offences 
are committed in the context of a criminal organisation, which a contrario implies 
that Framework Decisions are also applicable to offences committed outside criminal 
organisations.  
 
The  application  of  the  Framework  Decision  on  money  laundering  has  been  an 
example of this potentially broad scope of EU’s Framework Decisions. In Greece, for 
instance, individuals who were not members of a criminal organisation have been 
convicted for money laundering for the purchase of a stolen car, for the purchasing 
and selling of clocks and jewellery or for the purchase of bicycles from a racketeer. 
Accordingly, all of these offences were previously considered misdemeanours and 
now come under the broad umbrella of the definition of money laundering and are 
considered  as  aiding  or  abetting  organised  criminal  activities.
105  This  potentially 
broad scope of measures aimed primarily to engage in controlling organised crime led 
Symeodidou-Kastanidou to argue that “The measures adopted to combat organised 
crime  in  theory,  primarily  affect  people  who  have  nothing  to  do  with  it.  Hence, 
organised crime seems to be utilised as a pretext for the deformation of our political 
system’s  liberal  character”.
106  This  trend  of  generalisation  of  the  application  of 
measures to acts that are not necessarily related to organised crime partly empties the 
main rationale of the fight against organised crime and the focus strictly on serious 
criminality. Furthermore, it opens further paths of intervention of the EU in national 
criminal law thus allowing it to pursue other goals beyond the ones clearly stated 
further emphasising the continuously expanding scope of harmonisation on criminal 
matters.   
 
The  potential  application  of  such  measures  to  other  realms  of  criminality  beyond 
organised  crime  is  seen  in  a  second  dimension,  which  is  intertwined  with  the 
protection of EC policies. This is so because the concept of organised crime of the EU 
also facilitates the pursuit of other gals, such as the protection of the EU’s political 
system  (Framework  Decision  on  terrorism),  of  immigration  and  labour  markets 
(Framework  Decision  on  trafficking  of  human  beings),  or  of  the  financial  system 
(Framework Decisions on money laundering, fraud, etc), all of which are goals of the 
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single market which as a consequence largely benefits from the narrative of the fight 
against organised crime. Measures to fight human trafficking or money laundering in 
the context of the third pillar, for example, were adopted mainly to complement and 
render efficacy to a vast bulk of legislation on the topic already existent in the realm 
of the first pillar. Money laundering was the object of several measures adopted in the 
realm  of  the  first  pillar  in  the  nineties,  directed  at  the  single  market.  European 
legislation has been adopted since 1991 to protect the financial system and financial 
activities from being misused for money laundering. The first measure adopted in the 
context  of  the  fight  against  money  laundering  was  the  1991  Directive  on  the 
“prevention of use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering.”
107 
The Directive was adopted in the context of the freedom of establishment and single 
market provisions, based on a threat posed to the financial system, although its scope 
went  well  beyond  a  strictly  financial  rationale  and  established  a  comprehensive 
framework of repression and prevention of money laundering. The Commission then 
replaced the Directive of 1991 by a recent Directive in 2001 and by another in 2005 
on  the  prevention  of  the  use  of  the  financial  system  for  the  purpose  of  money 
laundering and terrorist financing.
108 The Directive now covers the laundering of drug 
trafficking, organised crime and fraud as defined in the EU instruments, corruption in 
general, and of offences that generate considerable proceeds and which are punishable 
by  severe  sentences  of  imprisonment,  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  the  Member 
State.  Furthermore,  the  criminalisation  of  trafficking  of  human  beings  came  to 
complement a broad range of measures to fight irregular immigration, namely the 
Directive  on  facilitation  of  unauthorised  entry,  transit  and  residence
109  and  the 
Framework Decision on strengthening the penal framework to prevent the facilitation 
on unauthorised entry, transit and residence.
110  
 
Organised crime can be interpreted very loosely as it was seen in the previous section. 
Accordingly, particularly in regards to white collar crime, Lacey and others observe 
that  “we  could  develop  an  expanded  perspective  which  would  also  label  as 
‘organised’  or  ‘professional’  crime  the  apparently  ‘respectable’  activities  of 
corporations and companies who systematically violate environmental laws or take 
calculated risks in terms of the safety of their products in order to increase their 
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profits. Indeed, the line between legitimate and illegitimate profit-oriented activity 
turns  out  to  be  exceedingly  fine.”  “The  idea  of  organised  crime  is  open  to 
reconstruction  in  the  light  of  reflection  about  forms  of  criminal  behaviour  which 
exists”.
111  The  question  to  be  asked  with  regard  to  the  EU  context  is  why  the 
reconstruction of the idea of organised crime has been framed in this particularly wide 
ranging,  broad  and  loose  manner.  It  seems  at  this  stage  that  the  EU  is  using  the 
rationale of the fight against organised crime, in relation to which it has specific 
competences to legislate under Article 31 (e) TEU, to regulate other areas directly or 
indirectly  related  to  EU’s  interests  in  relation  to  which  EU’s  competence  is  yet 
uncertain  or  even  in  relation  to  areas  which  are  still  strictly  a  matter  of  national 
competence, such as common criminality.    
3 - The EU broad approach and the increase in criminalisation at national level 
 
As  seen  previously,  harmonisation  of  criminal  law  has  been  expanded  to  a 
considerable number of areas of intervention. Nonetheless, the measures adopted do 
not aim at harmonising fully national criminal law. On the contrary, their aim and 
object  is,  as  seen,  very  limited.  Furthermore,  the  effectiveness  of  Framework 
Decisions is limited. Article 34 (b) states that they are binding upon Member States 
upon the result to be achieved, whilst leaving to national authorities the choice of 
form and methods. In practice, Framework Decisions are very similar to Directives 
although  two  main  differences  tame  substantially  their  effectiveness.  First, 
Framework Decision do not have direct effect and second the Commission has no 
mandate to oblige Member States to implement a Framework Decision or sanction 
that lack of implementation (there is no “enforcement action” against a Member 
States in the context of the third pillar). However, despite the fact that harmonisation 
of criminal law was envisaged to be minimal and that Framework Decisions have a 
limited effectiveness, the influence they exert on national legal orders, potentially or 
actually, is significant. 
 
This  section  will  thus  explore  how  the  expanding  intervention  of  the  EU  in 
harmonisation matters reflects on national criminal laws, namely by leading to an 
increase in criminalisation at domestic level, which is particularly visible in two 
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types of modifications required by the implementation of the Framework Decisions. 
First, the latter are requiring Member States to introduce, on occasion, new types of 
criminal  offences  that  did  not  exist  in  their  legal  orders.  Second,  Framework 
Decisions  are  often  enlarging  the  pre-existent  national  definitions  of  punishable 
conducts, which leads to the existence of more acts considered as criminal because 
the  definitions  given  are  broader.  This  occurs  primarily  because  the  concepts  of 
criminal behaviours agreed to at European level have a broader scope than that of 
many  pre-existent  national  legal  offences.  Ultimately,  this  is  leading  to  a  more 
restrictive criminal law across the EU, as more and more actions are punishable. This 
influence of EU measures on national laws in also made possible potentiated by the 
fact that Framework Decisions (and Joint Actions) establish the minimum standard 
for national laws, which tends to affect only more lenient domestic legislation than 
the  European  standard.  Thus,  as  the  objective  envisaged  is  the  one  of  minimal 
harmonisation, which leaves Member States the option to adopt or maintain more 
restrictive  national  legislations  than  the  ones  provided  for  by  the  Framework 
Decisions, only national laws which do not yet have that level of restrictiveness will 
be forced to change. This modification will be towards the criminalisation of new 
conducts or towards the broadening of the scope of existing criminal offences. This 
phenomenon  is  not  observable  in  all  adopted  EU  measures  but  there  are  a 
considerable number of examples. 
112 
 
 
Stricter national law under the rationale of organised crime 
 
Examples can be found with regard to trafficking in human beings, countries such as 
Estonia and Poland did not have criminal offences corresponding with the conducts 
described  in  the  Framework  Decision,  while  all  other  Member  States  already 
contained provisions relating to such acts.
113 Even in countries where such acts were 
already  considered  as  offences,  the  definition  of  trafficking  in  the  Framework 
Decision is broader than most pre-existing definitions in national laws and even in 
international instruments. This is because the EU introduced the additional general 
element of “labour exploitation”, while most legislations covered trafficking only for 
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the purposes of sexual exploitation, prostitution or forced or slave labour, while the 
purposes of labour exploitation are usually covered by legislation on smuggling of 
human beings (the concept itself is very general and difficult to circumvent). The 
United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
especially  women  and  children,  for  example,  also  offers  a  very  broad  notion  of 
trafficking,
114 but instead of the explicit purpose of “labour exploitation”, it mentions 
“forced labour or services, slavery or practices very similar to slavery”,
115 in a more 
limited formulation than that of the Framework Decision.  
 
Dutch law did not include in its definition of trafficking any other purpose beside 
sexual exploitation.
116 However, with the Framework Decision, the provision was 
amended  in  order  to  include  “coerced  or  forced  work  or  services,  slavery  and 
practices and bondage comparable to slavery.”
117 Likewise, Portuguese law, in the 
earlier versions of the Portuguese Penal Code, only considered trafficking of persons 
for the purpose of sexual exploitation.
118 However, in 2007 the crime was expanded 
in order to incorporate the purpose of labour exploitation and extraction of organs
119 
thus complying with the Framework Decision. The crime was also moved from the 
section of crimes against the “sexual freedom of the person” to the section of “crimes 
against personal freedom”.
120 Such a change was welcomed by legal commentators 
who  had  long  been  calling  for  such  an  expansion  in  the  categorisation  of  the 
crime.
121   
Likewise,  the  Framework  Decision  on  terrorism  also  offers  examples  of  the 
increasing scope of national criminal laws. The definition of terrorist offences led to 
the adoption of new criminal offences in most Member States and to an enlargement 
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of the definition already in existence in France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and 
the UK.
122 Besides, the definition adopted and proposed by the EU, is one of the 
largest  ever  adopted  or  proposed  by  national  legislations  or  academics.  The 
definition of terrorism has always involved a great amount of controversy.
123 Before 
the  implementation  of  the  Framework  Decision,  the  majority  of  States  treated 
terrorist actions as common offences. This changed with the Framework Decision, 
which obliged the 27 Member States to specifically define terrorist offences.
124 Only 
six  Member  States  had  specific  criminal  dispositions  covering  terrorism:  France, 
Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK, which basically treated terrorist crimes 
as common offences with a particular motivation. France, for instance, criminalized 
as “terrorist” an act that can seriously alter public order through threat or terror. 
Portugal  included  acts  that  were  able  to  prejudice  national  interests,  to  alter  or 
disturb the State’s institutions, force public authorities to do or not to do something 
or threaten individuals or groups. Spain treated subverting constitutional order and 
seriously altering public peace as terrorist acts. Italy had a law similar to Spain’s, 
criminalising terrorist actions as those that are able to subvert the democratic order. 
Finally,  the  UK  defined  terrorist  offences  as  acts  capable  of  influencing  the 
government  or  intimidating  the  public  order  or  a  section  of  the  public  with  the 
purpose of supporting a political, religious, or ideological cause.
125 The six countries 
which  already  criminalised  terrorist  acts  had  to  enlarge  the  number  and  type  of 
behaviours to be included in their definitions. The remaining EU Member States 
were required to create a “new offence” that covers conducts that either were not 
punished before or were punished as “common” criminality and hence considered 
less serious or morally wrong, rather than specifically labelled as terrorist crimes, as 
they are now. 
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In relation to illicit drug trafficking there are also some relevant changes in national 
legislations. The national legislation of at least four Member States
126 did not include 
“illicit drug trafficking” as a particular criminal offence, although they often focused 
on  punishing  related  offences,  such  as  production,  cultivation,  extraction, 
acquisition, and possession, among others.
127 A study by the United Nations showed 
that there were considerable differences between national laws.
128 German law, for 
instance, criminalised “illicit narcotics trafficking” and Italian law, the “distribution 
of  illegal  drugs”.
129  The  use  of  the  expression  “drug  trafficking”  is  necessarily 
broader than the latter, because “drug” includes more substances than “narcotics”. 
Indeed, marijuana or even a prescription medication can be included in the concept 
of “drug”, while only opium, morphine or, in the broad sense, cocaine and heroin are 
considered  “narcotics.”
130  Hence,  to  criminalise  the  trafficking  of  drugs  is  more 
restrictive than to criminalise the trafficking of narcotics or illegal drugs and while 
the former would not, strictu sensu, be considered a criminal offence under German 
law it is required to be so following the Framework Decision on drug trafficking. 
Moreover, the necessity of the substance to be “illicit” is also dropped. This means 
that the trafficking of drugs that are not prohibited must now also be criminalised in 
Italy. Finally, trafficking is a broader concept than mere “distribution”, hence Italian 
law  must  also  enlarge  the  punishable  conduct  to  cover  cases  which  are  not 
distribution but which might be considered trafficking. 
 
Furthermore, the Framework Decision on attacks against information systems also 
emphasises this trends. The proposal for a Framework Decision holds that national 
laws in this area contained significant gaps and differences. Spain, The Netherlands 
and Poland for instance did not criminalise the unauthorised but intentional access to 
information systems altogether (so-called “hacking”), whose criminalisation is now 
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called for by Article 3 of the Framework Decision.
131 Greece, Italy and Slovenia, on 
the other hand, only criminalised hacking when the system is protected by security 
measures, condition not required by the Framework Decision. Finally, Greece did 
not  criminalise  the  illegal  interference  of  data,  whereas  the  United  Kingdom, 
Belgium,  Spain  and  Finland  criminalised  only  the  alteration,  damaging  or 
deterioration  of  computer  data,
132  but  not  the  deletion,  suppression  or  rendering 
inaccessible of the same data, as required by the Article 4 of Framework Decision. 
 
These examples of actual and potential extended criminalisation in the EU space 
reflect  the  paradox  of  minimum  harmonisation  in  criminal  matters:  while  the 
harmonisation of criminal law is to focus merely on minimum elements constituent 
of crimes, as seen earlier, this is sufficient to substantially change the national legal 
orders,  increasing  its  scope  both  qualitatively  and  quantitatively.  This  increased 
scope suggests that the EU measures are making more harsh the criminal law of a 
number of national legal orders, as these are required to criminalise more offences 
than before.  
 
To be sure, the harshening of national legal systems is a phenomenon common to 
many western legal orders for some decades now. Whilst the USA and the UK are 
the most striking examples in this matter,
133 many other European countries have 
been evolving towards a harsher penality either through the imposition of harsher 
sentences  or  by  passing  stricter  statutes  (although  the  studies  available  focuses 
almost exclusively on punishment and not on the definition of offences).
134 This 
suggests that European measures came to potentiate these trends by bringing about 
broader definitions of crimes into national legal orders.  
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Conclusion 
 
Harmonisation of criminal law was envisaged as minimal not only in its content – 
minimum  elements  constituent  of  crimes  and  penalties  –  but  also  in  the  areas  of 
intervention that are clearly mentioned in the Treaty – organised crime, terrorism and 
drug trafficking. Nonetheless, such a minimal nature has been hardly kept and what 
has been seen is a dynamic of expansion of the number of areas in which the EU 
intervenes and of further criminalisation. Organised crime has been the key rationale 
for  the  adoption  of  the  majority  of  measures  and  the  enactment  of  a  very  broad 
approach in this domain has facilitated its application to petty criminality and the 
indirect attainment of other objectives. Furthermore, EU measures are leading to an 
increase in criminalisation in several national legal orders by creating new criminal 
offences and by enlarging the scope of pre-existent ones. The overall dynamic of this 
field is definitely one of increasing intervention and criminalisation which comes to 
emphasise  the  existent  trends  of  harsher  criminal  law  seen  in  many  western 
democracies. 
 